In what I have written concerning the Constitution of Bulgaria I have endeavored to explain the theory of government under which the affairs of the State are administered. But in all countries, and especially in all countries whose institutions are of novel and, to a certain extent, of exotic origin, there is always a marked difference between theory and practice. It would be a mistake to assume that, because Bulgaria possesses Parliamentary institutions, she is governed absolutely and entirely after the fashion of a genuine constitutional State.
It would be an equal mistake to conclude that, because her administration is not always conducted in strict compliance with constitutional principles, the country is therefore under autocratic rule. If I were compelled to define the government of the Peasant Kingdom, I should say the State was administered on democratic principles, tempered by autocratic practice. Let me try and show what is meant by this seeming paradox.
There are, to use our English political phraseology, three Estates in Bulgaria: the Crown, the Ministers, and the Sobranje. The Prince possesses larger powers than those exercised by ordinary constitutional sovereigns. In practice, as well as in theory, he appoints the Ministry and commands the army, while his personal favour or disfavour exercises an influence in politics which the mere will of the sovereign cannot exercise in countries where Parliamentary government is fully established and recognized.
His power, however, of interference in political affairs is limited by certain very important restrictions. He can appoint and dismiss Ministers, but he cannot maintain permanently in power any Ministry which is out of harmony with national sentiment as represented by the Sobranje. Nor, even if he had the full support of his Ministers, could he carry out any policy which was distinctly and directly in opposition to the will of the country.
Whatever may be the defects, either of the Sobranje or of the army, both these bodies are essentially national institutions, composed of exactly the same elements as the mass of a singularly homogeneous population. Under existing conditions, it is almost impossible to conceive of any administrative measure proving grossly distasteful to the country without being equally distasteful to the Sobranje and to the army. It follows that, however wide the powers of the Prince may be, these powers cannot be exercised in direct opposition to national sentiments.